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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the effects of inward foreign direct investment on local 
workers’ wages by focusing on U.S. manufacturing industries for the period from 
1987 to 1992. I use two different approaches to control individual characteristics and 
to implement estimation in this study: (1) One-step estimation with industry-state 
level of inward foreign direct investments, and (2) Two-step industry characteristic 
regression approach. I find that the higher presence of foreign firms is associated 
with higher local wages after workers’ observable characteristics are controlled for in 
cross-section analysis. However, I did not find a positive association between inward 
FDI activities and industry wage premiums within industry in a panel data analysis. 
In this analysis, inward FDI activities appeared to be negatively associated with 
worker’s industry wage premium for workers with more than high a school education.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This study aims to provide additional evidence to the literature on the impact 
of inward foreign direct investment on local labor markets by investigating at inward 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in U.S. manufacturing industries. One of the 
important aspects of the recent globalization process is the increase in FDI stock. The 
ratio of world FDI stock to world gross domestic product increased from 5% to 16% 
from 1979 to 1999 and world FDI inflows also rose to 14% (UNCTAD World 
Investment Report, 2000).  
When local governments offer various benefits such as tax exemption and 
free or low cost land use to attract foreign investment, they hope that FDI inflows 
will create jobs and increase welfare for workers. This is the case for both local 
governments of developing countries and of developed countries. In 1999, 67.7% of 
total inward stock of FDI was distributed in developed countries while only 32.1% 
was distributed in developing countries (UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2000). 
In the United States, the value of inward foreign direct investment was merely one 
quarter of U.S. direct investment abroad in the late 1970s, but it had reached over 
three quarters of the level of U.S. direct investment abroad by 1997-99 (Lipsey, 
2001). 
Previous studies on the effect of inward FDI on labor market outcomes have 
shown that foreign firms are more productive and pay higher wages compared to 
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domestic firms (Lipsey, 1994, Doms and Jensen, 1996, Feliciano and Lipsey, 2001). 
These studies have also noted that the increased presence of foreign manufacturing 
plants is associated with increases in real wages for all workers in that industry and 
local area. In other words, there exists a positive spillover-effect of foreign 
investment on the local labor market (Figlio and Blonigen, 2000, Lipsey and Sjöholm, 
2001).  
However, using the US manufacturing level data from 1977 to 1994, 
Blonigen and Slaughter (1999) conclude that inward FDI has not contributed to U.S. 
within-industry skill upgrading. In fact, they found that greater Japanese Greenfield 
(new investment) affiliate’s presence is significantly associated with lower relative 
demand for skilled workers. In high skill intensive industries, there is no evidence 
that foreign-owned establishments pay wages that are different from those paid by 
domestic-owned establishments (Feliciano and Robert Lipsey (2001)). Furthermore, 
Hanson (2001) found some evidence that a host country’s subsidies to foreign firms 
might actually lower its welfare. 
As these contradictory findings on the effect of inward foreign direct 
investment on local labor markets suggest, there are several different mechanisms by 
which foreign investments might affect local wages. Hence they cannot be 
predetermined. Even if we assume that foreign firms pay higher wages than do 
domestic firms as several studies have found, their impact on local labor markets 
cannot be clearly predicted. This is primarily because the impact depends upon 
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whether foreign investments are carried out through new investment (Greenfield 
investment) or through mergers and acquisitions of local firms. This impact also 
depends on the relative demand for skilled/less skilled workers of foreign owned 
firms.  
For instance, let’s suppose that a foreign firm is established in a local area in 
which there are domestically owned firms that produce the same product as the new 
foreign firm and that the latter uses the same skill structure of its workers as domestic 
ones. This would suggest that the demand for skilled and less skilled workers in the 
local area will increase, positively impacting the wages for both. However, if a newly 
established foreign firm uses more skilled workers than the local firms use, then only 
the wages for skilled workers will increase. Table 1 summarizes the possible 
directions of local wage changes in the presence of foreign ownership. If foreign 
investments are carried out through the merger and acquisition of local firms, their 
impact on local wages is not clear for both skilled and less-skilled workers. Further, 
if the newly acquired firm uses the same management style that has practiced before 
changes in ownership structure, no significant changes in local wages will result 
immediately for both skilled and less-skilled workers. However, if foreign ownership 
tries a different management style, then local wages will also change accordingly. In 
the United States, approximately 95% of employment in new foreign direct 
investments have taken place in the form of acquisitions of existing local firms 
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between 1987 and 1992 (Feliciano and Lipsey, 1999). Therefore, their impact on U.S. 
labor market cannot be predetermined clearly as described above. 
In this study, I investigate the effects of inward foreign direct investment on 
local workers’ wages by focusing on U.S. manufacturing industries for the period 
from 1987 to 1992 using individual level data. Previous studies that used the plant 
level data (or industry level) on wages could not control for variation of individual 
characteristics including occupational differences within workplaces and industries. 
Two different approaches are used to control individual characteristics and to 
implement estimation in this study: (1) One-step estimation with industry-state level 
of inward foreign direct investments, and (2) Two-step industry characteristic 
regression approach.  
The ideal data for this study would be individual level data that has 
information both on the ownership structure of firm and on the level of foreign 
ownership presence in local labor markets. Since no data exist for this purpose, I use 
grouping technique in micro data by using both Current Population Survey (CPS) 
Merged Outgoing Groups and Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Foreign Direct 
Investment in the U.S. Establishment data. Industry-state level cell is created for 
inward foreign direct investment levels in the first approach. I estimate inter-industry 
wage differentials and regress them on industry characteristics in the second 
approach.  
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To preview the results, I found that the fraction of foreign firms in the 
industry and the state is associated with higher wages after workers’ observable 
characteristics are controlled for in cross section analysis. However, I did not find a 
positive association between inward FDI activities and industry wage premia within 
industry with a panel data analysis. In this analysis, inward FDI activities appeared to 
be negatively associated with worker’s industry wage premium for workers with 
more than high a school education. This finding suggests that inward foreign direct 
investment has not contributed to the improvement of worker’s welfare for the period 
from 1987 to 1992.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section 
discusses the methodology and data utilized in this study. Section three presents the 
econometric findings regarding the impact of inward FDI upon local worker’s wages 
and discusses various interpretations of empirical evidences. The final section 
provides an overall assessment of this study and relates the findings here with the 
literature at large.  
 
2. Methodology and Data 
 
Previous econometric studies on the relationship between inward foreign 
direct investment and workers’ wages have used firm average wages or industry 
average wages, and therefore did not control for workers’ heterogeneity within the 
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firm or industry.1 If foreign firms hire better-qualified workers and pay higher wages 
than do locally owned firms, the firm level or industry level analysis with average 
level of wages cannot capture this fact. In other words, econometric results suffer 
from selection bias.  
Unfortunately, no individual data with detailed ownership of workplace are 
available with which one can control for workers’ characteristics in investigating the 
effect of foreign ownership on wages. This makes an individual level analysis in 
addressing the question foreign ownership’s effect on local wages difficult. However, 
one can pursue this type of analysis by merging two different sources of data. I 
adopted two different strategies to control workers’ characteristics and make use of 
available datasets for this purpose: (1) OLS estimation of the earning equations by 
including industry-state level characteristics, and (2) Inter-industry wage differential 
approach: two-stage estimation approach (e.g. Dickens and Katz, 1987; Krueger and 
Summers, 1988). 
 
2.1 One-step estimation with industry-state level of FDI 
 
The first approach is to include the proportion of the foreign firms at state-
industry level in the earnings equation by using Current Population Survey (CPS) 
                                                 
1 Some studies distinguished production workers’ wages from non-production workers. For example 
Blonigen and Salughter (2001). 
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data. I constructed the share of foreign firms at the level of industry and regional (50 
States) cells by using Foreign Direct Investment in the United States Establishment 
Data for 1992. This data is available as the result of the project that links Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) enterprise, or company, data on foreign direct investment 
in the United States with the Census Bureau’s establishment data for all U.S. 
companies.2  
I use 1991 to 1993 Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups from the CPS to 
construct cells at the industry-state level. I used 63 three-digit manufacturing 
industries (some industries include more than two three digit industry codes ─ a 
complete list of the industry is given in the appendix), and 50 States (District of 
Columbia is merged with Maryland and there are only 20 manufacturing firms in 
DC). The estimation is restricted to workers aged 16-76 who satisfy sample-selection 
rules: (1) the individual is employed in the private sector; (2) the individual works for 
pay more than one hour a week; (3) the individual earns more than a dollar and less 
than 250 dollars an hour; (4) the individual is employed in a manufacturing sector 
except tobacco industry. 
In order to assess the effect of foreign ownership on the local wages, I 
estimated the following regression form, 
                                                 
2 FDI data in the United States are not adjusted for percentage of foreign ownership. As long as one 
establishment of each U.S. affiliate that are owned by foreign investor by more than 10% will be 
included as foreign-owned establishment. Most U.S. affiliates are majority owned (that is, affiliates 
that are owned more than 50 percent by foreign direct investors) accounted for 83 percent of all 
employment by U.S. affiliates in 1992 (Bureau of Economic Analysis, Foreign Direct Investment in 
the United States Establishment Data for 1992)  
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ln ijs ijs js ijsw X Dβ γ ε= + +      (1) 
 
ijsw is the logarithm of the hourly wage of individual i in industry j and state s. ijsX  
(1k) is a vector of demographic characteristics, which includes years of schooling, 
experience, and its square, dummies for female, non-white, whether the individual 
lives in an SMSA, and part-time status. jsD is the fraction of firms that are owned by 
foreign entity in each industry-state cell, which does not vary at the individual level. 
ijsε is the usual i.i.d., zero-mean regression error with constant variance. β  and 
γ (k1) are parameters to be estimated. 
 Since I use the aggregated industry-state level data at individual micro data 
analysis, the associated econometric issue should be addressed. When the 
aggregation data are used at micro data analysis, it is likely to bias the estimates, 
which leads to incorrect standard errors that exaggerate the statistical significance of 
the included group variables (Moulton, 1986). In order to implement the estimation 
of equation (1) and to obtain standard errors that are robust to a group structure in 
error term, I included group-level, which is an industry-state cell clustering in the 
estimation.  
   
2.2. Two-stage Regression Approach 
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 I also employ a two-step estimation method in order to examine the effects of 
inward foreign direct investment activity on inter-industry wage differentials in US 
manufacturing sector. This study on industry wage differentials is based on the 
assumption that industry wage differentials depend on industry characteristics. The 
extension sought in this study is that inward foreign direct investment activity also 
affects industry wage differentials as important industry characteristics. I estimated 
the effect of inward FDI on wages by including industry fixed effects in the 
regression analysis to control for industry-specific characteristics.  
The wide wage differences across industries have been persistent for a long 
period of time (Kruger and Summers, 1987) and this fact has challenged standard 
competitive labor market theories (Katz and Summers, 1989; Borjas and Ramey, 
2000). The industry wage premium is the component of the wage that is given to 
individuals while working in the industry, but is not due to any specific individual 
characteristics, either observed or unobserved.3 In this study, industry premia are 
treated as compensation for particular industry characteristics to see whether the 
presence of foreign ownership in the industry is associated with industry wage 
premia.  
                                                 
3 This premium may capture the fact that the industry of affiliation is important in determining wages, 
as in the case of compensating differentials (loyalty, firm-specific knowledge, or (dis)comfort), or it 
may be that industry affiliation is systematically correlated with unobserved worker attributes (as 
would result from a worker sorting process based on unobserved ability), or both (Gibbons and Katz, 
1992). 
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 There are two advantages in using this two-step approach over a one-step 
approach in this study. First, there are more detailed data on inward foreign direct 
investment that can be utilized with the two-step approach. In order to avoid 
disclosure of data on individual companies, BEA does not report information on 
employment and output information on industry-state level. For this reason, I am 
only able to use information of number on foreign firms in industry-state level in the 
previous one-step approach. However, I can utilize information about employment 
and output share of foreign firms in industry level with the two-stage approach 
because higher aggregation allows BEA to report data without the possibility of 
revealing information about individual firms. In addition, with the two-step approach, 
I can utilize longer period data on inward FDI to examine dynamics within industry. 
A possible drawback of cross-section data analysis in the previous section is that it 
cannot be used to control for industry fixed effects that may be correlated with the 
regressors. The existence of such correlations can lead to biased estimates. In order to 
correct this problem and utilize more detailed data, I used industry fixed effect 
estimation in the second stage of the two-step regression approach. I used three 
different measures of inward FDI activity in US manufacturing industries in the fixed 
effect estimation: (1) the proportion of number of foreign-owned establishments in 
US manufacturing industries, (2) the proportion of employee hired by foreign-owned 
establishments in US manufacturing industries, and (3) the proportion of output 
produced by foreign-owned establishments in US manufacturing industries. While 
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the first measure is available only for two years, 1987 and 1992, the remaining two 
measures are available for six years from 1987 to 1992.  
A unique industry level panel data set is constructed here by using three 
different data sets: (1) the Merged Outgoing Rotation Group (MORG) of Current 
Population Survey (CPS) data, (2) U.S. Direct Investment in the United States 
(FDIUS), Establishment Data for Manufacturing collected by Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) from survey, and (3) the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER)’s Manufacturing Productivity Database. The 63 BEA industry categories in 
manufacturing sector are used. Details about industry categories used in this study 
are provided in Appendix C.  
 
   *ln ij ij ij j ijw X D wβ ε= + +  (stage 1)    (2), 
 
  *jt p jt f jt jtw P Fα β β η= + + +  (stage 2)    (3), 
 
where ijD is a dummy for industry j, 
*
jw  is the wage premium in industry j, and jtP  is 
the vector of control variables for industry characteristics: unionization, profit level, 
capital-labor ratio, and average establishment size, jtF  is the inward foreign direct 
investment in the industry j measured either by the foreign establishments’ 
 14
employment share or sales share of  U.S. industry-wide activity, and t indexes time.4 
 In the first stage, logarithms of individual wages are regressed on individual 
characteristics and J industry dummies with coefficients *jw . In the second stage, 
*
jw  
are regressed on industry characteristics. 5  The disturbances in the second-step 
regression equations are heteroskedastic because the data for dependent variable 
themselves are estimated coefficients of the first-step regressions. I used the 
estimation with weights proportional to the covariance matrix of the estimated wage 
differentials from the first-stage regressions. 
   
3. Empirical findings and Discussion 
 
3.1 Results from one-step estimation with industry-state level of FDI 
 
The results from the estimation of equation (1) are shown in Table 5. 
Coefficients of the individual characteristics show signs and magnitudes that are very 
similar to those found in many studies. Inclusion of the industry-state level foreign 
firm’s presence in the regression is the extension made in this study. The sign of the 
                                                 
4 ijX are same vector used in regression equation (1). 
 
5 Inter-industry wage differential are normalized so that one can compare estimated industry wage 
premiums with average worker instead of workers in omitted industry. See Krueger and Summers 
(1988) for details. 
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estimated coefficient is positive and it is statistically significant. This suggests that 
the fraction of foreign firms in the industry and region is associated with higher pay 
for workers after workers’ observable characteristics are controlled. This finding is 
consistent with findings from previous studies that foreign firms pay higher wages to 
their workers with industry level analysis. The magnitude of coefficient of the 
fraction of foreign firms is very small, however, and implies that a 10% increase in 
foreign firms fraction leads to 0.02% increase in wages. 
 In tables 6, results from the regression equation with industry and state 
dummies are shown in columns (2)-(4). Including these dummies reduces the size of 
coefficients and their statistical significance. When industry and state dummies are 
added together, the estimated coefficient of the fraction of foreign firms is close to 
zero and statistically insignificant. Notice that including industry dummies in 
regression reduced estimated coefficient of FDI variable to 0.0004 and therefore 
reduced the t-statistic. Furthermore, when industry and region (state) dummies are 
added together into the regression equation, the estimated coefficient becomes even 
smaller and the null hypothesis of no explanation power of foreign ownership on 
individual wages cannot be rejected. However, it should be noted that the sizes of 
some industry-state cells are very small. 
 Howenstein and Zeile (1994) found wage differential between foreign owned 
firms and domestically owned firms and they attributed the wage differential to the 
larger average size of the foreign firms by using U.S. manufacturing industry data 
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with detailed information on industry and location. Feliciano and Lipsey (1999) also 
found that the wage differential between foreign owned and domestically owned 
establishments disappears once controls such as average size of establishment, and 
unionization are added by using establishment level data. Table 2 shows that the 
foreign direct investments are heavily concentrated in industries that are capital 
intensive. The top five industries in terms of foreign ownership presence are 
Chemicals and allied products (SIC code 28), Petroleum and coal products (SIC code 
29), Stone, clay, and glass products (SIC code 32), Primary metal industries (SIC 
code 33), and Electronic and other electrical equipment (SIC code 36). Table 3 also 
reveals that foreign-owned establishments are densely located in Southern States. 
Almost every Southern State has inward FDI activity more than nation-wide average 
in every measure.   
 
3.2. Results from the two-stage approach 
 
Results from the second-stage regressions of two-stage estimation method are 
shown in table 4.7. Column (1) and (2) in all panels show results from the industry 
fixed effect regression of industry wage differentials on two different measures of 
inward foreign direct investment with other industry characteristics. Foreign 
affiliates’ employment share is measured by the fraction of foreign owned 
establishments’ employees in all U.S. establishments’ employees. Foreign affiliate 
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shipment is measured by the fraction of foreign owned establishments’ shipments or 
sales in all U.S. establishments’ shipments or sales. Column (3) and (4) in all panels 
show results from the industry fixed effect regression of industry wage differentials 
on inward FDI variables without other control regressors. From all workers panel, it 
is shown that two measures of inward foreign direct investments activity are 
negatively associated with inter-industry wage differentials and they are statistically 
significant at 5% level except for the first column. This negative sign implies that 
workers wage premia due to their industry affiliation decreases as inward foreign 
direct investment activity increases. The estimated coefficient ranges from –0.08 to –
0.13 depending on measure and specification, which implies that the pay for all 
workers is about 1 percent lower for any 10 point changes in foreign firms 
employment.  
 I also estimated the second-stage regression with different groups in terms of 
workers’ educational attainment to see if inward FDI has different effects on wages 
across different skilled groups. The results are shown in the second and the third 
panels in table 6. Even though the null hypothesis of zero effect of inward FDI on 
wages cannot be rejected, the signs of coefficients in workers with up to high school 
education are uniformly negative. However, the negative effect of inward FDI 
activity becomes substantial and statistically significant in the case of skilled workers. 
The estimated coefficients are around –0.20 implying that pay for workers with more 
than high school education decreases by 2% at any 10 points increase in inward 
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foreign direct investment activity. Blonigen and Slaughter (2001) found no evidence 
that inward FDI activity contributed to skill upgrading in U.S. manufacturing 
industries by using industry level analysis and the result from the second-stage 
regression of this study support their findings. Additional regression of inter-industry 
wage differentials among union members on inward FDI activity fails to show 
statistical significance. 
 The contrast between results from the industry characteristics approach and 
results from the individual level analysis seems puzzling at first. However, this 
contradiction can be accounted for by differences between these two approaches. 
While the first approach is a cross sectional approach, the second approach used 
panel data analysis to control for industry fixed effects that may be correlated with 
other regressors. With fixed effects panel analysis, results from the two-stage 
approach reveal that biases in the cross-section approach in this study introduced by 
omitting fixed effects are substantial. Since the measures of inward FDI activity are 
different in two methods, results may not be completely comparable and the 
contrasting results are due differences in measures rather than omitted industry fixed 
effects. In order to check this possibility, I regressed equation (4-3) with inward FDI 
variable measured by the proportion of number of foreign-owned establishment for 
only two years (1987 and 1992) due to the availability of data. While there are still 
discrepancy between two-year period and six-year period (the other two-stage 
estimations), the results in table 8 show that there is no statistically significant 
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relationship between industry wage differentials and inward FDI activity measured 
by the proportion of the number of foreign-owned establishments in US 
manufacturing sectors, which supports the bias problem that resulted from omitted 
industry fixed effects in the cross-section approach.6 
 The negative association of inward foreign direct investment activities with 
industry wage premiums, especially for skilled workers, might suggest an increase in 
competition within an industry between foreign owned and domestically owned firms. 
Inter-industry wage differential captures the portion of rents that are given to workers. 
It is possible for inter-industry wage differential to decrease as the whole size of rent 
shrinks, which results from more competition within an industry. Therefore, even 
though the presence of individual foreign establishment is associated with higher pay 
for individual workers, overall industry wage premium that workers used to enjoy 
can be negatively associated with higher foreign firms’ activity within an industry, as 
the second-step regression results demonstrate. 
 It is also possible that more foreign firms within an industry are associated 
with a weaker bargaining position of skilled workers. Approximately 95% of 
employment in new foreign direct investments was in acquired enterprises between 
1987 and 1992 (Feliciano and Lipsey, 1999). Growing activity of foreign firms 
within industry could imply that domestic ownership has been simply converted to 
                                                 
6 When I estimated regression equation (3) with the other two inward FDI variables by treating panel 
data as a cross section data, the results become similar to those from the first approach. The estimated 
coefficients of inward FDI activities are around 0.50 and they are statistically significant at 5% level 
(t-statistics are around 10). 
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foreign ownership. Under new management workers might feel more insecure about 
their job than under domestic ownership, for it is well known that the most important 
reason for the opposition of foreign ownership is the fear of job losses.     
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 This paper explores the relationship between inward foreign direct investment 
and wages in U.S. manufacturing industries. If inward FDI takes place mostly by 
acquisition of existing domestically owned firms, the demand shift effects might not 
be large enough to influence wages in local labor market. Instead, even though 
foreign-owned firms tend to pay higher wages, it is not clear that workers benefit 
from new ownership structure and new management policy. It is also possible that 
increasing inward FDI activities within an industry can change a rent sharing system 
that would be persistent under local ownership by increasing competition among 
firms within industry.  
 Results from this study support this idea. This study demonstrated that the 
fraction of foreign firms in an industry and state is associated with higher pay for 
workers after workers observable characteristics are controlled in a cross section 
analysis. However, it did not find a positive association between inward FDI 
activities and industry wage premia within an industry with a panel data analysis. 
Instead, inward FDI activities appeared to be negatively associated with worker’s 
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industry wage premium among workers with more than a high school education. This 
finding suggests that inward foreign direct investment has not contributed to improve 
workers welfare for the period from 1987 to 1992. 
 This study extends the existing literature on effects of inward FDI in terms of 
two aspects. First, this study used individual level analysis in order to control 
workers characteristics in finding effects of inward FDI on wages. Previous empirical 
analysis in this field could not control workers characteristics since they used average 
firm or industry level wages. Second, this study also used a unique panel data set to 
understand dynamics of relationship between inward FDI activities and wages within 
industry. While previous studies that used industry-level panel data set could not 
control worker’s characteristics, this study used two-stage estimation method to do so 
in analyzing effects of inward FDI on wages. 
Results from this study suggest further studies are necessary to examine the 
impact of the growing presence of foreign ownership on the bargaining relationship 
between foreign owners and local workers and their spillover effects on domestically 
owned firms. Threat effects theory suggests that the threat by firms to move 
production abroad, or the threat to outsource may have an important impact on wages 
and profits even in the absence of large price or quantity changes due to changes in 
the environment of capital mobility, such as the establishment of NAFTA and WTO 
(Crotty, Epstein and Kelly, 1998, Rodrik, 1997;1999, Reddy 2000). If foreign 
investors use the threat to move or close plants in bargaining situations, labor unions 
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might perceive it as a more credible threat than domestic firms. Therefore it is very 
important to look at the bargaining relationship between foreign owners and local 
workers (union) to understand effects of inward FDI activities on wages in local 
labor market theoretically and empirically.  
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Table 1. The Inward FDI and Local Wage Changes 
 
Greenfield Foreign 
Investment 
 
Skill 
Intensive
Same Skill 
Intensive* 
 
Merger and 
Acquisition 
Skilled Workers Wage  
Increase 
 
Increase 
 
? 
Less Skilled Workers 
Wage 
 
No 
change 
 
Increase 
 
? 
 
Note: * Foreign Establishment use the same skill intensity as the local firms use. 
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Table 2. Number and Employment of Foreign-Owned Establishments by Industry 
  
Foreign-owned establishments 
 
Foreign-owned establishments as 
a % of all U.S. establishments 
Industry 
SIC 
code
Number of 
establishments 
Number of 
employees 
Number of 
establishments 
Number of 
employees 
Manufacturing*  12781 2004947 3.3 11 
Food and Kindred Products 20 1013 156123 4.9 10.4 
Textile mill products 22 203 48454 3.4 7.9 
Apparel and other textile products 23 116 26776 0.5 2.7 
Lumber and wood products 24 152 13492 0.4 2.1 
Furniture and fixtures 25 108 10000-24999 0.9 - 
Paper and allied products 26 289 46529 4.5 7.4 
Printing and publishing 27 836 98209 1.3 6.6 
Chemicals and allied products 28 1635 240829 13.6 28.4 
Petroleum and coal products 29 360 27097 16.9 23.7 
Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products 30 742 125724 4.7 13.9 
Leather and leather products 31 27 5351 1.3 5.3 
Stone, clay, and glass products 32 1484 92791 9.1 19.8 
Primary metal industries 33 413 113770 6.4 17.2 
Fabricated metal products 34 686 101681 1.9 7.5 
Industrial machinery and equipments 35 1094 190106 2 10.9 
Electronic and other electrical equipment 36 812 224855 4.8 15.6 
Transportation equipment 37 331 115177 2.9 7 
Instruments and related products 38 481 106667 4.2 11.8 
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 39 162 27570 1 7.5 
Notes: Data source: from Bureau of Economic Analysis Foreign Direct Investment in the United States 
Establishment Data for 1992. 
*: Except Tobacco products industry 
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Table 3. Number and Employment of Foreign-Owned Establishments by State 
 
Foreign-owned 
establishments 
Foreign-owned establishments as a % of all U.S. 
establishments 
 
Number of 
establishments
Number of 
employees 
Number of 
establishments
Number of 
employees Value added 
Value of 
Shipments 
All Manufacturing 12,781 2,004,947 3.3 11 13.7 14.5 
       
Alabama 218 38,722 3.4 10.2 15.4 15.2 
Alaska 18 2,300 3.6 14.7 13.5 14.3 
Arizona 116 10,151 2.4 5.7 5.5 6.6 
Arkansas 115 18,878 2.9 8.3 12 12.1 
California 1,475 189,710 2.9 9.7 11.7 12.8 
Colorado 115 12,715 2.2 7 8.4 9.1 
Connecticut 222 35,878 3.5 11.2 11.6 11.7 
Delaware 73 29,892 9.9 44.8 34 30.1 
District of Columbia 20 288 4.4 2.2 1.5 2 
Florida 495 43,805 3 9.3 10.9 12.5 
Georgia 531 68,415 5.4 12.3 19.6 16.4 
Hawaii 27 1,644 2.6 8 9.7 23.4 
Idaho 25 2,424 1.4 3.7 6.3 5.1 
Illinois 713 120,917 3.8 12.5 13.4 17.1 
Indiana 385 81,572 4.1 13.2 15.9 16.7 
Iowa 109 20,170 2.8 8.9 9.8 8.7 
Kansas 99 13,019 2.9 6.9 8.4 8.2 
Kentucky 242 46,294 5.6 16.8 17.2 20.1 
Louisiana 132 19,862 3.3 11.1 21.5 28.5 
Maine 59 5,995 2.7 6.6 8.3 9.3 
Maryland 188 24,615 4.3 12.7 14.2 14.8 
Massachusetts 351 48,284 3.5 10.1 11.7 13.4 
Michigan 443 74,639 2.7 8.1 8.7 10 
Minnesota 189 30,895 2.4 7.9 7.9 7.7 
Mississippi 109 13,724 2.9 5.8 8.7 8.8 
Missouri 273 34,547 3.5 8.4 12.3 10.9 
Montana 16 1,137 1.2 5.3 10.2 16.5 
Nebraska 62 9,511 3.1 9.5 14.7 9.7 
Nevada 36 2,544 2.9 9.3 12.6 12.9 
New Hampshire 91 11,807 3.9 12.6 13.2 14.5 
New Jersey 588 99,779 4.4 17.4 25.9 23.2 
New Mexico 33 3,140 2.1 8 5.2 4.5 
New York 620 94,378 2.3 9 10.3 10.9 
North Carolina 549 114,330 4.6 13.8 20 19.4 
North Dakota 13 1,181 1.9 6.4 6.8 6.4 
Ohio 685 122,716 3.7 11.7 15 16.3 
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Oklahoma 109 16,494 2.7 10.6 12.5 15.2 
Oregon 137 18,542 2 8.8 8.4 11.3 
Pennsylvania 684 118,187 3.8 12.4 13.6 14.1 
Rhode Island 42 6,090 1.6 6.9 8.6 10.4 
South Carolina 287 64,229 5.9 17.5 20.3 22.1 
South Dakota 17 2,621 1.9 7.4 7.3 6.3 
Tennessee 305 75,880 4 15.2 18.3 22.3 
Texas 858 105,159 4 11 15.4 15.6 
Utah 47 6,385 1.9 6.2 8.5 9.4 
Vermont 31 3,977 2.3 8.9 7.1 9.6 
Virginia 255 50,031 3.9 12.3 13.9 14.5 
Washington 227 25,119 2.7 7.4 8.1 8.7 
West Virginia 69 16,988 3.9 21.6 34.3 35.5 
Wisconsin 268 45,137 2.7 8.3 9.5 9.5 
Wyoming 10 230 1.7 2.6 3.6 2.9 
 Notes: Data source: from Bureau of Economic Analysis Foreign Direct Investment in the United States 
Establishment Data for 1992. 
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Table 4. Sample Statistics for the First Regression Strategy 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
ln(wage) 1.034 0.225 
Individual Characteristics   
Schooling (years) 13.273 2.781 
Labor Force Experience 19.772 12.048 
Experience Squared 536.081 566.356 
Union Member (1=yes) 0.204 0.403 
Lives in South (1=yes) 0.300 0.458 
Employed Part-Time (1=yes) 0.061 0.240 
Engineer-Scientist (1=yes) 0.059 0.236 
White-Collar (1=yes) 0.309 0.462 
Skilled (1=yes) 0.190 0.393 
Semi-Skilled (1=yes) 0.357 0.479 
Unskilled (1=yes) 0.071 0.256 
Male (1=yes) 0.660 0.474 
Non-White (1=yes) 0.133 0.340 
Unmarried (1=yes) 0.349 0.477 
Veteran (1=yes) 0.171 0.376 
Lives in SMSA (1 =yes) 
 
0.710 
 
0.454 
 
Presence of Foreign Firms* 5.359 8.090 
Notes: Statistics are for 94,994 individual observations.  
* Presence of foreign firms are industry (63 manufacturing industries)-state (50, D.C. merged with Maryland) 
level observations. 
 
 29
Table 5. OLS Estimation with Industry-State Level of FDI 
Dependent Variable: Log of Hourly Wages 
Independent Variable Estimated Coefficient t-Statistic 
Individual Characteristics   
Union Member 0.055 11.930 
Schooling 0.025 56.813 
Labor Force Experience 0.011 43.293 
Experience Squared -0.0002 -33.973 
Lives in South -0.032 -7.943 
Employed Part-Time -0.099 -22.381 
Engineer-Scientist 0.107 43.293 
White-Collar 0.010 1.459 
Skilled -0.051 -7.538 
Semi-Skilled -.114 -16.425 
Unskilled -0.140 -20.075 
Male 0.109 51.793 
Non-White -0.039 -11.980 
Unmarried -0.030 -23.329 
Veteran 0.003 1.533 
Lives in SMSA 0.049 15.591 
 
Group Characteristics 
Presence of Foreign Firms 0.002 7.425 
Number of Obs 94717  
F-Statistic 1213  
R-Square 0.487  
Notes: Data source: Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups from 1991 to 1993. Presence 
of foreign firms was industry-state level fraction of foreign firms. 3150 cells (50 states  63 manufacturing 
industries). Data are from Bureau of Economic Analysis Foreign Direct Investment in the United States 
Establishment Data for 1992. 
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Table 6. OLS Regression Estimates  
Dependent Variable: Log of Hourly Wages 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Presence of Foreign Firms 0.0020 0.0004 0.0015 0.0001 
 (7.4250) (2.0740) (6.9780) (0.5270) 
 
Industry dummies No Yes No Yes 
 
State dummies No No Yes Yes 
Notes: t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. Sample size is 94717 constructed by merging CPS Merged Outgoing 
Rotation Groups from 1991 to 1993. Actual regressions also include other individual characteristics shown in 
table 3, and results are very similar across specifications. Presence of foreign firms was industry-state level 
fraction of foreign firms. 
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Table 7. Effects of Inward FDI Activity on Industry Wage Differentials 
(Dependent Variable=Estimated Industry Wage Differentials) 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
All Workers 
Foreign firm's employment share -0.079  -0.099  
 (-1.539)  (-2.010)  
Foreign firm's shipment share  -0.117  -0.130 
  (-2.504)  (-2.863) 
R-Squared 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
 
Workers with 0-12 Years of Schooling 
Foreign firm's employment share -0.005  -0.025  
 (-0.084)  (-0.405)  
Foreign firm's shipment share  -0.053  -0.061 
  (-0.916)  (-1.082) 
R-Squared 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.93 
 
Workers with 13+ Years of Schooling 
Foreign firm's employment share -0.197  -0.206  
 (-2.077)  (-2.256)  
Foreign firm's shipment share  -0.212  -0.221 
  (-2.431)  (-2.606) 
R-Squared 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 
 
Union Members 
Foreign firm's employment share 0.031  0.030  
 (0.323)  (0.329)  
Foreign firm's shipment share  0.018  0.018 
  (0.205)  (0.211) 
R-Squared 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 
Notes: All regressions include industry and years dummies. Weights are equal to the inverse of the variance of the 
estimated wage differential in the first regression. Regressions for (1) and (2) include other control variables of 
industry characteristics: union membership, capital-labor ratio, average-establishment size, and profit. t-statistics 
are in parenthesis. Number of observations are 378 for all specifications and panels. 
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Table 8. Effects of Foreign Firms Presence on Industry Wage Differentials 
(Dependent Variable=Estimated Industry Wage Differentials) 
Independent Variable 
All Workers 
 
(1) 
Workers with 
0-12 Years of 
Schooling 
(2) 
Workers with 
13+ Years of 
Schooling 
(3) 
Union 
Members 
 
(4) 
     
Proportion of number of  
Foreign-owned establishment 
0.002 
(0.093) 
0.001 
(0.671) 
0.002 
(0.536) 
0.003 
(0.909) 
     
     
Number of Obs. 126 126 126 126 
R-Squared 0.97 0.97 0.90 0.94 
Notes: All regressions include year dummies. Weights are equal to the inverse of the variance of the 
estimated wage differential in the first regression. t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
